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STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE
This is an appeal from conviction

of the Defendant/

Appellant of a charge of theft by deception, of an aMount
of over $2,000.00, a felony of the second degree.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Defendant/Appellant was charged, tried and convicted
of theft by deception involving a sum greater than
$2,000.00, a felony of the second degree. Defendant
waived a jury and the case was tried to the Honorable
Bryant H. Croft and Defendant was found guilty as
charged.

Defendant's Motion for New Trial was denied

and this appeal was then filed.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant/Appellant seeks reversal of the lower
court's conviction.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On November 3, 1976, James Dennis Smith and his
wife Eileen, purchased a 1973 Chevrolet Monte Carlo automobile from Love Motors, in part owned by the Appellant,

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for1digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Kenneth M. Forshee, Jr.

The car, at the time of sale,

allegedly indicated approximately 33,000 miles on the
odometer.

Subsequently the Smiths allededly found a

lubrication sticker indicating the vehicle at the date
on the sticker had in excess of 71,000 miles.

The

Smiths brought this to the attention of one J.R. McKnight
of the Utah State Motor Vehicle Business Administration
and to the attention of the Appellant.

Negotiations

were had between the Smiths and the Appellant, Forshee.
Forshee

~ffered

it with a

l~ke

to repurchase the vehicle or replace
model with acceptable mileage which was

refused, the Smiths indicating they were pleased with
the vehicle and did not want to give it up; Forshee
offered also to rebuild the engine in the vehicle,
guarantee the transmission for 60,000 miles and overhaul the carburetor, which offer the Smiths accepted.
Shortly thereafter Forshee was arrested,

jailed and

charged with theft by deception under §76-6-405, Utah
Code Annotated 1953 as amended 1973, of a sum in excess
of $2,000.00, a felony of the second degree.

The

Defendant was tried, therefore, and upon the State's
having rested its case, the Defendant moved to dismiss

2
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for having failed to prove a theft of over $1,000.00,
which Motion was denied, trial was completed, Defendant
was convicted of theft by deception, a felony of the
second degree, his Motion for New Trial was denied and
he appealed therefrom.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.

WHERE A PERSON ALLEGEDLY ALTERS THE
INDICATED MILEAGE ON THE ODOMETER
OF A MOTIR VEHICLE HE SHOULD BE
CHARGED UNDER THE UTAH STATUTE
SPECIFICALLY PROHIBITING SUCH AN ACT.

It is a general rule of statutory construction that
where two statutes treat of the same subject matter, the
one general and the other specific in its provisions, the
specific provision controls.

Salt Lake City v. Salt Lake

County, 60 Utah 423, 209 P. 207; State ex rel P.S.C. v.
Southern Pacific Company, 95 Utah 84, 79 P.2d. 25; State
v. Burnham, 87 Utah 445, 49 P.2d. 963; P.I.E. v. State Tax
Commission, 7 Utah 2d. 15, 316 P.2d. 549; Bateman v. Board
of Examiners, 7 Utah 2d. 221, 322 P.2d. 381; Bureau of
Revenue v. Western Electric Company, 89 New Mexico 468,

3
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553 P.2d. 1275 (1976); Holder v. State, 556 P.2d. 1049
(Oklahoma Cr. 1976) and more specifically; absent clear
expression of intent to make existing special statutes
inapplicable, a special statute is to be given effect.
Kuckler v. Whistler, 552, P.2d 18 (Colorado 1976).
It may be argued here, where discussing the theft
by deception provision of §76-6-405 vs the odometer provisions of §41-6-176 et sec of the Motor Vehicle Code,
that there is no

conflict of the two statutes.

There

should not be a conflict because there is no indication
anywhere tt.2t

tr>.c.

theft by deception statute was ever

intended by the legislature to apply to the instant
situation.

Once the prosecution chose to attempt to so

apply said statute then a conflict arises in that at
that point, the theft by deception statute is being applied
to a situation wherein the dominant act or unlawful act
is that of altering the indicated mileage on an odometer
with the apparent intent to reduce the true number of
miles indicated upon the odometer guage, which is the very
act made unlawful by §41-6-177{1) and made a misdemeanor
offense by §4l-6-l78,Utah Code Annotated 1953.

Therefore,

4
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if the theft by deception statute is to be applied it is
1

on its face a general statute dealing with theft by
deception 1 in general with any deceptive act, whereas
the odometer statutes deal specifically with deception
as to indicated mileage of motor vehicles.

It is clear

then, that the legislature has actively considered the
practice of altering indicated mileage on odometers
of motor vehicles and has decreed that to so do is to be
a misdemeanor offense.

It is not at all clear that the

legislature has considered the alteration of indicated
mileage on the odometers of a motor vehicle in the
context of a theft by deception.
The Supreme Court of Kansas had occasion to consider
a similar situtation in its recent case of State v.
Kliewer, 504 P.2d 580, 210 Kansas 82 (1973); wherein the
defendant had been found to have sold an automobile with an
altered odometer and was convicted of unlawful business
practices and of altering the mileage on an odometer "with
the intent to reduce the number of miles of use thereof
indicated on such gauge .... "

Both were misdemeanor off-

enses, but one statute was general, dealing with business

5
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practices and the other specific, dealing with altering
indicated odometer readings.

The court then said,

( p

585 P.2d. repts.)
"under these circumstances where there
is a conflict between a statute dealing
generally with a subject and another
statute dealing specifically with a
certain phase of it, the specific statute
will be favored over the general statute
and controls. (State v. Christensen, 166
Kansas 152, 157, 199 P.2d. 475; Moody v.
Edmondson, 176 Kansas 116, 120, 269 P.2d.
462: Ferrellgas Corporation v. Phoenix
Insurar,ce- :ompany, 187 Kansas 530, 535,
358 P.2d 86; and Barten v. Turkey Creek
W.J.~. No. 32, 200 Kansas 489, 506, 438
P. 2d 732"
By adhering to the above principle the clear
legislative intent is given full force and effect, in
tha~

only in the specific statute is it clear just what

the intent of the legislature was with regard to the
specific subject matter.

Here it is clear that

the legislature intended the act of alteration of indicated mileage on a motor vehicle was to be an offense,
but one of misdemeanor severity.

It was clearly

not intended to be a second degree felony, nor did the
legislature intend that an ingenous prosecutor should
be able to circumvent the Motor Vehicle Code provisions
by concocting a theory that would circumvent an already
enacted statute dealing with specific subject matter.
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POINT II.

THE CRIME OF THEFT BY DECEPTION
IS NOT ESTABLISHED IN THE ABSENCE
OF EVIDENCE SHOWING TH~T THE ~LAIMED
VICTIM HAS SUSTAINED A PECUNIARY OR
PROPER~Y LOSS BY REASON OF THE
TRANSACTION RELIED UPON.

Prior to the enactmert of t!1e new Utah Criminal
Code the offense parallell to theft by deception was
theft of obtaining money or property by false pretenses.
The Court's attention is drawn to twc such Utah cases;
Sta~e

v. Caspersen et. al., 71 Ctah 68, 262 P. 292 (1927)

arid State v. Morris, 85 Utah 210, 38 P.2d. 1097 (1934).
The Court in Caspersen said at page 75 of 71 Utah Reports:
"that a pretense false in fact and an actual
fraud resulting in prejudice (emphasis supplied)
are essent~al elements of the crime in question,
and must be proved to establish guilt, are
general principles of law which we recognize and
approve.
The actual fraud and prejudice
required, however, is determined according
to the situtation of the victim immediately after
he parts with his property.
If he gets what
was pretended and what he bargained for,
there is no fraud or prejudice. But if he then
stands without the right or thing it was pretended he would then have, he has been defrauded and prejudiced by reason of the false
pretense and the offense is complete ... "
The Court in the Morris case (supra) cites the above
language of Caspersen and goes on ta say on page 216 of 86
Utah Reports
"Thus in the instant case the purchaser (complaining witness) received a part but not all

7
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that it bargained for. The only reasonable
inference, however, which may be drawn from
the evidence before us is that the purchasing
corporation received, and at the time of the
trial had sufficient security to satisfy,
the amount owing on the contract, which it
purchased.
Under such facts may it be
said that the defendant is guilty of the
crime for which he stands convicted? We
are of the opinion that the question must be
answered in the negative. Before a recovery
may be had in a civil action on the grounds
fo fraud, it must be established that the
complaining party has sustained some damage
on account of the fraud.
Were this a civil
case in which the purchasing company was
seeking to recover a money judgment against
the defendant on account of the fraud complained o~ no recovery could be had because
the ev1jenc2 fails to show that the purchasing company sustained any injury:
The
mere fact that a party to a transaction
may not have received all he bargained for
does not give rise to civil liability.
For
stronger reasons the crime of obtaining money
by false pretenses is not established in the
absence of evidence showing or tending to show
that the claimed victim has sustained a
pecuniary or property loss by reason of the
transaction relied upon." (emphasis added)
In the instant case the transcript indicates
that the vehicle in question was purchased for
Eileen Smith, one of the complainants.

(Transcript

page 101 lines 1-4) The complainants testified that
they liked the vehicle and were satisfied with it
except for a minor oil consumption matter.

8

(Transcript
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page 73-74; page 98 line 6-8; page 101 line 24-25)
The complainants purchased the automobile for $2,830.00.
(Transcript page 136 line 10) The record contains unrebutted evidence that the average wholesale value of
that particular vehicle was $2,975.00 and that the
average retail value of said automobile was at that time
approximately $750.00 higher or $3,725.00.

(Transcript

page 139 lines 8-17)
It is quite clear then that the complainants were
not prejudiced at the conclusion of the transaction in
question.

They obtained a quid-pro-quo, the fair

market value of the automobile at wholesale was greater
than the price paid by the Smiths.

The fair market

value at retail was clearly in excess of the price paid
by the complainants.
Theft is defined in §76-6-404 Utah Code Annotated,
1953, as "a person commits theft if he obtains or
exercises unauthorized control over the property of
another with purpose to deprive him thereof."

Theft is

traditionally viewed as involving a situation in which
the complainant loses his property or money and suffers
a demonstrable loss measured as the fair market value

9
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of the property of which he was deprived.

Here, the

Smiths testify that they liked the vehicle obtained,
in fact to the extent of being unwilling to sell it
back to Forshee or to have it replaced with a like
year and model Chevrolet Monte Carlo with fewer
miles.

(Transcript page 97 line 21; page 98 line 15)

Mrs. Eileen Smith wanted that particular automobile!
The complainants suffered no pecuniary or property
loss as a result of the instant transaction.
The

~rcs~ctuion,

at the time of argument of

Defendant's !Appellant's) Motion to Dismiss submitted
to the Court a Memorandum citing two California cases;
People v. Ross 25 California App. 3rd 190, 100 Cal.
Rptr. 703 (1972) and People v. Hess, 10 California App.
3rd. 1071, 90 Cal. Rptr. 208 (1970).

The Hess case

(supra) involved a situation in which the Defendant,
Hess, fraudulently obtained a

registration certificate

on a stolen mixed breed poney, represented to be a
blooded Arabian horse by the name of Ingaia worth over
$3,000.00 and who then sold the horse receiving $550.00
from the complainant.

Hess tried to claim the severety

of the crime should have been measured by subtracting
the $200.00 actual worth of the horse from the complainant's out of pocket loss. The Court pointed out there

10

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

that Hess didn't have title to the pony and couldn't
convey anything to the complainant.

The Ross case

(supra) used as precedent the Hess (supra) case and
People v. Brady, 275 California App. 2d. 984, 80 Cal.
Rptr. 418. Both Hess and Brady involved sale, pursuant
to misrepresentation of terms, of stolen property
and appear to be cases where the prosecution could not
get the Defendant for the theft of the subject of
the sale but could only make out a case on the
fraudulent sale, which was, in any event, of property
which neither Defendant had title and, therefore, out
of pocket loss of complainant was the amount that changed
hands.

The Ross case (supra) is admittedly parallel to

the instant case except that Ross sold 5 automobiles
with altered odometers to other used vehicle dealers.
The Ross case (supra), however, is not proper precedent
for the Utah Courts to use to overrule the Utah cases
of Caspersen and Morris (supra) :

Ross at present is an

anomalous result which has not been validated by the
California Supreme Court, and is founded in faulty
reasoning as will be discussed later.

11
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It should be pointed out to the Court that under
our statute, theft is the crime. Theft meaning a pecuniary
or property loss of some degree.

A theft may be pre-

petrated in many ways, deception being only one of
the ways; deception is not a crime in and of itself.
POINT III. A CRIMINAL STATUTE THAT DOES NOT
CLEARLY INFORM THE AVERAGE PERSON OF NORMAL
INTELLIGENCE AS TO JUST WHAT CONDUCT IS TO
BE PROSCRIBED WORKS AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL
DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION
OF THE LAW AGAINST HIM.
As the Court said in State v. Shondel, 22 Utah
2nd. 3 4 3 , 4 c; < P. 2d. 14 6 ( 19 6 9) ,
"The well established rule is that a statute
creatlng a crime should be sufficiently
certain that persons of ordinary intelligence
who desire to obey the law may know how to
conduct themselves in conformity with it ...
State v. Musser, 118 Utah 537, 223, P.2d
193; U.S. vs. L. Cohen Grocery Co., 255
u.s. 81, 41 S.Ct. 298, 65 L.Ed. 516; Lauzetta
v. New Jersey, 306 U.S.451, 59 S.Ct. 618,
83 L.Ed. 888, a fair and logical concomitant
of that rule is that such a penal statute
should be similarly clear, specific and understandable as to the penalty imposed for its
violation."
The Court's attention in this regard in again
drawn to State v. Casperson (supra) where the court
said p. 74, 71 Utah Rprts.:

12
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"Such statutes, like all other criminal ones
must be construed strictly as against
accused person and liberally in their favor
and nothing not within their words held to
be within their meaning. 2 Bishop Criminal
Law (9th Ed.) §415." (emphasis supplied)
Appellant is aware of the provisions of
§76-1-106 which provide that the rule of strict
construction is not applicable to the new Utah
Criminal Code, but would point out that the last sentence
thereof refers to §76-1-104 " ... to effect the objects
of the law and general purposes of §76-1-104."
part says in §76-1-104

(2) and (3)

Which in

" ... the provision

of the code shall be construed in accordance with these
purposes ... (2) define adequately (emphasis supplied) the
conduct and mental state which constitute each offense and
safeguard conduct that is without fault from condemnation
as criminal.
ate

(3) Prescribe penalties which are proportion-

(emphasis supplied) to the seriousness of offenses ... "
It is submitted that considering the above language,

and the demise of the rule of strict construction not
withstanding, that the last clause of the quoted language
from Casperson (supra)

is still good law and sensibly s0,

if it may be repeated:

13
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" ... and nothing not within their words held to be within
their meaning. 2 Bishop Criminal Law (9th Ed.) §415."
(emphasis supplied)
It is submitted that

wher~given

the standard set

forth in Shondel (supra),and the language emphasized above
in Casperson (supra), that the person of ordinary intelligence, desiring to obey the law, could not read the language of §76-6-404, "theft-elements,'' "a person commits
theft if he obtains or exercises unauthorized control
over the ,:roper;::," of another with a purpose to deprive
him thereof." and §76-6-405(1), theft by deception,
(1)

"a person commits theft if he obtains or exercises

control over property of another by deception and with a
purpose to deprive him thereof."

(both citations Utah

Code Annot"ated as amended, 1953); and therefrom know that
he would be committing a felony of the second degree if he
sold a motor vehicle with an altered odometer reading
knowing thereof and misrepresenting same.

It is further

submitted that such a result is not within the words of
the two statutes cited and could therefore not properly
be held to be within their meaning.
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Standards of fariness as well as of due process
and equal protection of the laws demand that when conduct,
which has been freely and frequently engaged in by a certain
segment of society, is to be proscribed as criminal, there
should be a clear showing of legislative intent to so
proscribe such conduct and there should be clear warning
and notice that such conduct in the future will be so
punished.

(It is elementary that there can be no ex-

post-facto laws.)
It is submitted that the practice of altering
odometers by used car dealers has in the past been such a
wide spread practice that the Court could take judicial
notice of it.
To allow the present conviction to stand would be to
allow a denial of due process and of equal protection of
the law against the Appellant.
POINT IV.

ASSUMING ARGUENDO, THAT THERE WAS
A THEFT, THE AMOUNT INVOLVED DID NOT
EXCEED THE $1,000.00 REQUIRED FOR
CONVICTION OF A FELONY OF THE SECOND
DEGREE.

For a conviction to be affirmed in the instant case,
the state was obligated to prove theft of an amount of
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over $1,000.00. §76-6-412(a)
as amended.

(i) Utah Code Annotated, 1953,

As has already been cited by Appellant in

Caspersen and Morris (supra), before a plaintiff could
recover in a civil suit he would be required to show damages
and where he could not there would be no recovery.

As the

Court has said "for stronger reasons" there must be a
pecuniary or property loss before there can be a crime
of obtaining money by false pretenses or as the current
statutes provide, a theft.
uncontrovercej t:

The State produced testimony

Appellant that the purchase price

for the 1973 :hevrolet Monte Carlo in question was
$2,830.00. But, there is also uncontroverted testimony
that the complainants received a vehicle for their
$2,830.00 the fair market value of which,was,at wholesale
value $2,975.00 and at retail value worth an additional
$750.00 or $3,725.00 (Transcript page 139) the complainants
testified they liked the car and did not want Forshee
to repurchase it or replace it.

So there was not only

no proof of theft of over $1.000.00 in satisfaction of
the requirement for a second degree felony, there was no
proof of a theft of any amount, and the

Defendant's

Motion to Dismiss (Transcript page 104, page 117),
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therefore, should have been granted.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons contained in the foregoing argument,
the appellants' conviction for theft by deception, a felony
of the second degree, should be reversed and he should be
acquitted of the charge.

There was no theft, no pecuniary

or property loss, the complainants purchased an automobile
they liked and would not return or exchange.

If they can

prove any such loss,they can recover in a civil action (which
has been brought by them - tr. p. 67 line 27 - p. 68 line 22).
When the complainants brought the matter of the mileage disparity to Forshee, an agreement to appease the Smiths was
entered into wherein Forshee would rebuild the engine in the
vehicle and guarantee the transmission thereof for 60,000
miles beyond that date.
10-15).

(tr. p. 75 line 11-16, p. 100, line

They then are complainants in a trial where Forshee

is convicted of a second degree felony.
The language of the applicable statutes relating to theft
and theft by deception must be tortured to be held to proscribe the sale of a vehicle with an altered odometer whether
with intent to deceive or not.

If there was no deception,

would the prosecution claim such a transaction was a plain
out and out theft?

The argument for that would be just as

sound as for theft by deception, where deception was present.
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That would at least be consistent, but the prosecution relies
on the California cases earlier cited and would have the Court
approve their inconsistency.

The California cases say that

the crime is the deception, that if a defendant had
sold vehicles with altered odometers, and had said, yes,
the indicated mileage is correct when it was not, there was
then a crime; but if tbe defendant knew the mileage indicated
was incorrect but remained silent about it, tf.ere was then no
crime.

This would be the result in the instant case if this

Court affirms Forshee's conviction.

If the evidence had shown

Forshee to have been silent about the indicated mileage, or
if it had

show~

he had indicated he knew nothing about the

indicated mileage,there would have been no intended deception
for the buyer to rely on -- no crime -- no conviction.
This is a case of first impression in this Court and to
affirm the above thinking would set dangerous precedent.

When

a misrepresentative situation exists then, to avoid criminal
liability one need merely be silent or profess no knowledge
about the misrepresentation.
It is submitted that if the California court's position
was consistent, they would have to hold that if the crime is
misrepresentation, that it is just as much a crime to sell a
buyer a vehicle with incorrect mileage indicated and tell him
nothing as to tell him it is correct mileage.

For if it is~·
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the first case a "theft by deception" it is therefore in the
second case a "theft" without the deception.
It becomes evident then that the only fair standard to
use is that already established by this Ccurt is Morris and
Casperson, supra:

That the crime is the theft,and that there is

no theft without pecuniary or property loss, therefore, in
this case the conviction should be reversed.

Respectfully submitted,

D. KENDALL PERKINS
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant
Twelve Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone:
(801) 532-5835

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated
19OCR, may contain errors.

